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INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 2015, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus made
headlines by tripling the Navy’s allotment of paid maternity leave.1
Although commendable, this expansion failed to increase the Navy’s
paternity leave allowance, which affords new fathers only ten days
of paid leave.2 Notably, due to limitations set by Congress, those ten
days were exclusively reserved for sailors married to the mothers of
their newborn children.3
Less than nine months after Secretary Mabus’s announcement,
Defense Secretary Ash Carter proposed sweeping changes to the
parental leave policies of all United States military branches.4
Carter’s proposal called for a uniform twelve-week maternity leave
and the expansion of paternity leave from ten to fourteen days.5
Although Carter’s proposal is still awaiting congressional ratifi-
cation, early indications suggest his plan will do little to cure a
lingering defect in the military’s paternity leave policy: the use of
marriage as an exclusive proxy for fatherhood.6
1. See Meghann Myers, Navy Triples Maternity Leave for Sailors, USA TODAY (Aug. 6,
2015, 11:24 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/08/06/maternity-
leave-navy-sailors-31211055/ [https://perma.cc/C468-EA57].
2. See U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, NAVAL MILITARY PERSONNEL MANUAL 1050-010, at 4 (2013)
(“Paternity Leave—A period of authorized absence up to 10 days granted to a married Service
member whose wife gives birth to a child and is subsequently used in connection with this
birth.”).
3. See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L.
No. 110-417, § 532, 122 Stat. 4356, 4449 (2008) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) (2012)) [herein-
after NDAA]. 
4. See Jamie Crawford & Jim Sciutto, Pentagon Sets Maternity Leave at 12 Weeks, CNN
(Jan. 28, 2016, 7:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/28/politics/defense-department-materni
ty-leave-ashton-carter/ [https://perma.cc/UV4Q-QQBH].
5. See id.
6. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FACT SHEET: BUILDING THE SECOND LINK TO THE FORCE OF
THE FUTURE STRENGTHENING COMPREHENSIVE FAMILY BENEFITS 2 (2016) [hereinafter FACT
SHEET] (setting out Secretary Carter’s plan to expand paternity leave in the military, but
making no mention of altering the marriage requirement). In the wake of Carter’s an-
nouncement, Congresswoman Tammy Duckworth proposed the Military Parental Leave
Modernization Act, which aims to “allow any service member, regardless of gender or marital
status, to take 12 weeks of leave following a child’s birth, adoption or foster placement.” See
Amy Bushatz, Lawmaker Proposes Bill to Expand Military Paternity Leave to 12 Weeks,
MILITARY.COM (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/03/22/lawmaker-
proposes-bill-expand-military-paternity-leave-12-weeks.html [https://perma.cc/HY2X-6FDB].
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In a nation where more than 40 percent of children are born out
of wedlock,7 reason demands that we critically reexamine any poli-
cy that hinders the formation of parental bonds in nonmarital
families. Although ten days—or even the proposed fourteen days—
of leave might seem insignificant in the greater scheme of father-
hood, the military’s current paternity leave policy promulgates two
troubling assumptions: (1) unmarried fathers are somehow less
deserving parents than their married counterparts, and (2) non-
marital children are somehow less deserving of paternal care than
their “legitimate” peers.8 
This Note contends that the military’s paternity leave policy,
currently codified at 10 U.S.C. § 701(j)(1), is logically flawed, po-
tentially unconstitutional, and sorely in need of revision. Part I
examines the general societal value of paternity leave, the legisla-
tive history of 10 U.S.C. § 701(j)(1), and the faulty reasoning that
likely led to the law’s adoption in 2009. Part II imagines and
assesses the viability of a constitutional challenge to the law on the
basis of illegitimacy discrimination. Additionally, Part II demon-
strates how such a challenge would call attention to the inherent
shortcomings of the military’s current paternity leave policy. Part
III considers the implications of revising 10 U.S.C. § 701(j)(1)
and advocates for a functional modification of the law that would
afford all military fathers a fairer opportunity to spend time with
their newborn children. Despite its seemingly progressive aims,
10 U.S.C. § 701(j)(1) manages to perpetuate a longstanding assump-
tion about the insignificant role of unmarried fathers in American
families and demands revision.
7. See Brady E. Hamilton et al., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Births: Prelimin-
ary Data for 2014, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REPS., June 17, 2015, at 1, 4 (“The percentage of all
births to unmarried woman declined to 40.3% in 2014, from 40.6% in 2013.”); see also Andrew
J. Cherlin et al., Changing Fertility Regimes and the Transition to Adulthood (May 3, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), http://paa2014.princeton.edu/papers/140559 [https://perma.cc/
4YF5-C3AK] (discussing how data from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth showed that, by the time the cohort had reached ages 26-31 in 2011, “57% of the
births ... had occurred outside of marriage”).
8. If language itself is any indication of societal assumptions, it is difficult to contend
that children born to unmarried parents are favorably regarded in the United States.
Although the categorical label of “illegitimate” connotes more positivity than its predecessor,
“bastard,” illegitimate still seems to suggest deficiency. This Note uses the label “nonmarital”
throughout, even though it is also negatively phrased and only slightly more endearing.
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I. THE ORIGINS OF PATERNITY LEAVE IN THE MILITARY
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009
created the first codification of a uniform military paternity leave
policy in the United States through its adoption of 10 U.S.C.
§ 701(j).9 The law provides that, contingent upon approval from a
serviceman’s commanding officer, a serviceman may take up to ten
days of paternity leave in connection with his wife giving birth.10
Despite its flaws, the legislation provides married servicemen with
a valuable benefit that few American men enjoy: paid paternity
leave.11 Given this relatively novel backdrop, any qualitative as-
sessment of the military’s paternity leave policy must be predicated
on a clear understanding of the context and rationalities that led to
its creation. This Part explores the background of 10 U.S.C. § 701(j)
by first considering the social value of its aim, then by examining
the provision’s legislative history, and finally by speculating on
Congress’s reasons for using marital status as a proxy for father-
hood.
A. The Social Value of Paternity Leave
By establishing a paternity leave policy for the military, Congress
implicitly acknowledged that such a policy served some worthy end.
Although the precise details of that end are discussed at length in
later sections of this Part, this Section considers the worth of
paternity leave generally: What benefits are realized when fathers
have access to paternity leave, and which stakeholders realize those
benefits?
A crucial preliminary matter in this discussion is whether fathers
even use paternity leave when it is available to them. This inquiry
is necessarily shaped by a number of case-specific factors—such as
whether leave is paid, its duration, and socio-cultural norms—but
9. See NDAA, supra note 3.
10. See 10 U.S.C. § 701(j)(1) (2012).
11. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PATERNITY LEAVE: WHY PARENTAL LEAVE FOR FATHERS IS
SO IMPORTANT FOR WORKING FAMILIES 2 (2014) (citing JACOB ALEX KLERMAN ET AL., FAMILY
AND MEDICAL LEAVE IN 2012: TECHNICAL REPORT 135 (2012)) (finding 13 percent of men
receive paid parental leave).
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is crucial to assessing the actual impact that paternity leave policies
have on society.12 Although American men face substantial “econo-
mic and social barriers that keep them from taking longer paternity
leaves, such as inadequate access to paid leave and outdated work-
place norms about male breadwinners,”13 recent international
studies suggest an intuitive result: when paid paternity leave is
available, fathers are more likely to take it.14 
Although no foreign sample can identically model the behavior of
American fathers, a study that tracked the conduct of Spanish fath-
ers after Spain introduced its thirteen-day paternity leave is
particularly revealing.15 There, a national paternity leave allowance
that was much shorter than those offered in Germany and other
Scandinavian countries,16 but close to the ten-day mark currently
set by the United States Military,17 resulted in significantly more
fathers taking paternity leave.18 Interestingly, that study also
found “the probability of being on childbirth leave [was] higher
among those fathers working in the public sector.”19 Another study
tracking fathers working in Quebec found that “establishing a
12. Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, American men have access to up to twelve
weeks per year of unpaid leave to use in connection with the birth of a child. See Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993 § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) (2012). Despite this allowance, “in
the United States ... social and cultural biases along with gaps in policy make fathers even
less able to access time away from work for their children.” U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note
11, at 1.
13. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 11, at 1.
14. See Lorenzo Escot et al., Fathers’ Use of Childbirth Leave in Spain: The Effects of the
13-Day Paternity Leave, 33 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 419, 449-50 (2014) (“These findings
confirm the hypothesis that in Spain the introduction of paternity leave has increased the de-
gree to which men use the Spanish childbirth leave system.”); Sakiko Tanaka & Jane
Waldfogel, Effects of Parental Leave and Work Hours on Fathers’ Involvement with Their
Babies, 10 COMMUNITY WORK & FAM. 409, 421 (2007) (examining the Millennium Cohort
Study, which covered a large group of children in the United Kingdom, and finding that “[f]a-
thers with access to parental leave or paternity leave are five times as likely to take some
leave after the birth, as otherwise comparable fathers who did not have such rights”); see also
Ankita Patnaik, Reserving Time for Daddy: The Short and Long-Run Consequences of
Fathers’ Quotas 17 (May 14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2475970 [https://perma.cc/Q8QN-2GHQ] (finding that the Quebec
Parental Insurance Program, which increased benefits for all parents, increased fathers’
participation by 250 percent).
15. See Escot et al., supra note 14, at 421.
16. See id.
17. See 10 U.S.C. § 701(j)(1) (2012).
18. See Escot et al., supra note 14, at 449-50.
19. Id. at 450. 
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nontransferable period of paternity leave in 2006 doubled fathers’
leave taking—from 22 to 50 percent, and by 2011 that [number] had
risen to 84 percent.”20 These findings suggest that, even when
offered for limited durations, the mere availability of paternity leave
makes fathers more inclined to take it.
The proposition that fathers take paternity leave when they have
access to it does not, by itself, do much to prove the value of
paternity leave. Accordingly, this discussion now turns to whether
paternity leave serves any real benefit to society. Given the relative
scarcity of paid paternity leave in the United States,21 much of the
empirical research on this subject comes from studies conducted
abroad. Despite this reality, the Department of Labor has summed
up paternity leave as a policy that “can promote parent-child bond-
ing, improve outcomes for children, and even increase gender equity
at home and at the workplace.”22
Various studies suggest that when fathers use paternity leave,
there is a notable increase in how much time they spend with their
children after that leave has ended.23 Whether this is the result of
fathers having greater access to father-child bonding time, or simply
their acquisition of competencies that prevent mothers from gaining
monopolistic expertise in child rearing, early father-child interaction
has been shown to result in fathers spending more time with their
children in the long-run.24 
20. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 11, at 5 n.20 (citing Andrea Doucet, Dad and Baby
in the First Year: Gendered Responsibilities and Embodiment, 624 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 78 (2009)). 
21. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
22. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 11, at 1.
23. See Tanaka & Waldfogel, supra note 14, at 421 (finding that in the United Kingdom,
“[f]athers who take leave after the birth are significantly more involved in the care of their
child 8-12 months later”); see also Lenna Nepomnyaschy & Jane Waldfogel, Paternity Leave
and Fathers’ Involvement with Their Young Children, 10 COMMUNITY WORK & FAM. 427, 428
(2007) (“We also find that fathers who take longer leave are more involved in child care-taking
activities nine months after the birth, even after controlling for a host of father, mother and
child characteristics, including measures of the father’s commitment to child care-taking prior
to the birth.”).
24. See Mari Rege & Ingeborg F. Solli, The Impact of Paternity Leave on Long-Term Father
Involvement 1-2 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 3130, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1649344 [https://perma.cc/T9A6-C547] (studying data from Norway related
to paternity leave quotas and finding results that suggest “paternity leave has the expected
positive effect on long-term father involvement”).
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Ultimately, it is this long-run increase in paternal involvement
that provides one of the most compelling justifications for paternity
leave. Although fathers can gain a greater sense of commitment
from increased interactions with their children, research suggests
that their children benefit significantly from those interactions.25
Not only have children’s school performances been shown to improve
as a result of fathers taking advantage of paternity leave quotas,26
but increased father involvement with children has been linked to
a decrease in adolescent behavioral problems27 and improved social
functioning in children.28 In light of this research, the expansion of
paternity leave policies in America should be viewed as an attempt
to benefit not only fathers, but also their children.
B. The Scant Legislative History of 10 U.S.C. § 701(j)
Interestingly, the Navy’s initial proposal to Congress for a
suitable paternity leave policy was for a longer and more inclusive
leave.29 To some extent, congressional compromise in 2008 shaped
the codification of the shorter, marriage-based policy.30 In light of
25. See Natasha J. Cabrera et al., Fathers’ Influence on Their Childrens’ Cognitive and
Emotional Development: From Toddlers to Pre-K, 11 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 208, 212 (2007) (“Over
and above mother engagements, fathers’ supportiveness matters for children’s cognitive and
language development across ages as well as children’s social and emotional behaviors.”). 
26. See Sara Cools et al., Causal Effects of Paternity Leave on Children and Parents, 117
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECONOMICS 801, 803 (2015).
27. See Anna Sarkadi et al., Fathers’ Involvement and Children’s Developmental
Outcomes: A Systematic Review of Longitudinal Studies, 97 ACTA PÆDIATRICA 153, 155 (2008)
(citing M. Carlson, Family Structure, Father Involvement, and Adolescent Behavioral
Outcomes, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 137-54 (2006)); see also Jen Jen Chang et al., Maternal
Depressive Symptoms, Father’s Involvement, and the Trajectories of Child Problem Behaviors
in a US National Sample, 161 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 697, 697 (2007).
28. See Sarkadi, supra note 27, at 155 (citing R. Levy-Shiff et al., Father’s Hospital Visits
to Their Preterm Infants as a Predictor of Father-Infant Relationship and Infant Development,
86 PEDIATRICS 289-93 (1990)).
29. See Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2009:
Hearing on S. 3001 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 110th Cong. pt. 6, at 149 (2008)
[hereinafter Hearing Before Comm. on Armed Servs.] (statement of Adm. J. Harvey) (“Navy
supports establishing a paternity leave policy that provides Service Secretaries discretionary
authority to grant up to 21 days permissive TDY [temporary duty] to be used in connection
with the birth of a servicemember’s natural child.”).
30. See Military Paternity Leave Rules Take Effect, SIP TRUNKING REP. (Jan. 5, 2009),
http://sip-trunking.tmcnet.com/news/2009/01/05/3889571.htm [https://perma.cc/K36A-HYG7]
(“In May 2008 the U.S. Senate Armed Forces Committee began a push to authorize up to
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these modifications, an understanding of the provision’s legislative
history is necessary to help decipher the rationalities that led to its
creation. 
Even today, American parental leave policies are some of the
least generous in the developed world.31 As discussed previously,
Congress’s adoption of a uniform paternity leave policy for the
military was, to some degree, a very progressive step in 2009.32
Despite its progressive nature, the precise origins of the policy set
forth in 10 U.S.C. § 701(j)(1) are not readily discernable from its
legislative history. This is due, in part, to the sheer enormity of the
bill that created 10 U.S.C. § 701(j), the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2009.33 The NDAA is a complex and
comprehensive annual spending authorization that provides fund-
ing for the entire Department of Defense and the national security
programs of the Department of Energy.34 The bill includes appro-
priations for a broad variety of affairs, ranging from “maintenance
of retired KC-135E aircraft,”35 to “chiropractic health care for mem-
bers on active duty.”36 For this reason, extensive legislative histories
are not often available for every provision embedded within the
NDAA.
Although a review of publicly available legislative records for
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 reveals relatively little discussion
of the paternity leave policy later adopted as 10 U.S.C. § 701(j), one
senator was a particularly outspoken champion for uniform mili-
tary paternity leave. Claire McCaskill, a Democrat from Missouri,
brought the issue to the forefront during two separate hearings of
the Senate Committee on Armed Services.37 During the first such
three weeks of paternity leave. A compromise with members in the House resulted in the 10-
day mark.”).
31. See Gretchen Livingston, Among 41 Nations, U.S. Is the Outlier when It Comes to Paid
Parental Leave, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 26, 2016), http://pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/26/u-
s-lacks-mandated-paid-parental-leave/ [https://perma.cc/A5NL-CZSL].
32. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 3.
34. See HOUSE ARMED SERVS. COMM., FACT SHEET: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES BILL, H.R. 1735 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016,
at 1 (2015).
35. NDAA, supra note 3, § 131. 
36. NDAA, supra note 3, § 703.
37. See Hearing Before Comm. on Armed Servs., supra note 29, pt. 1, at 142; id. pt. 6, at
148.
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hearing, Senator McCaskill provided some useful context on the
issue while addressing leaders of the armed services:
I think that it’s time for the ... Secretary of Defense to look at,
overall, a uniformity of policy between the various branches as
it relates to both maternity leave and acknowledgment of some
recognition of paternity leave. I know this was being discussed.
I know that there was a pullback that occurred by one of the
Under Secretaries of Defense about paternity leave. But, I just
wanted to say that I’m hopeful that you all continue to look at
that issue, because it dovetails nicely with what I want to ask
you about this morning, which is our ability to retain officers.38 
Sentator McCaskill went on to advocate for a military-wide pater-
nity leave policy during a later hearing of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, in which she addressed numerous military leaders:
I understand that most of the Services have indicated that they
support instituting a paternity leave policy that would permit
unit commanders to provide military members administrative
paternity leave at the commander’s discretion. It strikes me that
such a policy would be supportive of military families, would be
consistent with policies in the civilian sector, and would send a
strong message to servicemembers about the respect their
Services have for their personal lives. It also seems to me that
such a policy can only prove helpful in retention efforts.39
Later in that hearing, Senator McCaskill expressed concern that
the Department of Defense “may have ordered that work on patern-
ity leave policies be terminated and that the issue not be considered
38. Id. pt. 1, at 142 (statement of Sen. C. McCaskill). The information referred to by
Senator McCaskill as “being discussed” was as follows:
The Department of Defense is reviewing a legislative proposal that will amend
section 701 of title 10, U.S.C., to include a new authorization to allow up to 21
days of permissive temporary duty for servicemembers in conjunction with the
birth of a new child. The legislative proposal is consistent with a recent con-
gressional change to section 701 of title 10 (section 593), which authorized up to
21 days of administrative leave for a servicemember adopting a child. As with
all leave, paternity leave would be granted on an individual basis dependent on
the unit’s mission and operational circumstances.
Id.
39. Id. pt. 6, at 148 (statement of Sen. C. McCaskill).
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for a DOD-wide personnel policy initiative.”40 She questioned then
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness David S.C.
Chu on the matter,41 to which he responded:
This legislative proposal is being worked within the Department.
It would allow spouses up to 21 days of discretionary administra-
tive absence after the birth of a child. The Department is
weighing the proposal against operational readiness, cost, and
equity factors. We anticipate a decision on proceeding with the
present proposal by end of March 2008.42
Although these few comments do not express the views of every
member of Congress or Department official involved in the passage
of 10 U.S.C. § 701(j), they provide valuable insight into the logic that
shaped the legislation’s formation. Senator McCaskill twice men-
tioned that she believed the policy would benefit the military’s
personnel retention efforts.43 She also pointed out that a uniform
paternity leave policy “would be supportive of military families,
would be consistent with policies in the civilian sector, and would
send a strong message to servicemembers about the respect their
Services have for their personal lives.”44 These statements suggest
that Senator McCaskill intended the policy to benefit not only
servicemen, but also their families and “personal lives.”45
Under Secretary Chu’s remarks also shed light on the logic
underpinning 10 U.S.C. § 701(j)(1). By acknowledging that the
Department “weigh[ed] the proposal against operational readiness,
cost, and equity,”46 Chu revealed that feasibility and fairness
concerns likely limited the ultimate legislative outcome. By the time
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 was enacted, the paternity leave
allocation was limited to only ten days, and reserved for “a married
40. Id. 
41. Id.
42. Id. at 149 (statement of Sec. D. Chu). 
43. See id. pt. 1, at 142 (statement of Sen. C. McCaskill) (“I’m hopeful that you all
continue to look at that issue, because it dovetails nicely with what I want to ask you about
this morning, which is our ability to retain officers.”); id. pt. 6, at 148 (“It also seems to me
that such a policy can only prove helpful in retention efforts.”).
44. Id. pt. 6, at 148.
45. Id. 
46. Id. (statement of Sec. D. Chu).
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member of the armed forces on active duty whose wife gives birth
to a child.”47
Today, the military paternity leave policy remains very similar to
the one adopted in 2008.48 Congress has proposed a slight change to
the language, aiming to change “wife” to “spouse,”49 but even with
these changes, the updated statute would still read: “Under regu-
lations prescribed by the Secretary concerned, a married member of
the armed forces on active duty whose spouse gives birth to a child
shall receive 10 days of leave to be used in connection with the birth
of the child.”50 This change in wording would only impact married
lesbian couples, and has seemingly no effect on the unmarried
fathers for whom this Note advocates. In light of this limited leg-
islative history, this Note now builds upon that record by way of
inference.
C. Inferring Rationality: Why Marital Status Was Used as a Proxy
for Fatherhood
Because there is not a robust legislative record for 10 U.S.C.
§ 701(j), some speculation is required to create a fuller picture of
why Congress first enacted the marriage-centered military paternity
leave policy. Considering the societal gains of paternity leave,51
alongside Senator McCaskill’s remarks,52 Congress likely sought to
benefit servicemen and their families through the enactment.
Taking these worthy beneficiaries into account, why then did
Congress reserve this benefit exclusively for married fathers? Under
Secretary David Chu’s remarks provide a starting point to answer
this question,53 but his comments require further speculation. If
47. NDAA, supra note 3, § 532 (“SEC. 532. PATERNITY LEAVE FOR MEMBERS OF
THE ARMED FORCES.(a) LEAVE AUTHORIZED.—Section 701 of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: (j)(1) Under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary concerned, a married member of the armed forces on active duty
whose wife gives birth to a child shall receive 10 days of leave to be used in connection with
the birth of the child.”).
48. See 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) (2012). 
49. See H.R. 2976, 114th Cong. (2015).
50. See 10 U.S.C. § 701(j); H.R. 2976.
51. See supra Part I.A. 
52. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
53. See Hearing Before Comm. on Armed Servs., supra note 29, pt. 6, at 149 (statement
of Sec. D. Chu) (“The Department is weighing the proposal against operational readiness, cost,
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administrability and “equity”54 factors were truly the reasons marit-
al status was used as a substitute for natural paternity, then a
closer examination of that logic is necessary to assess Congress’s
ultimate decision.
1. Cost and Administrative Ease
It seems plausible to think that the financial and administrative
costs of an inclusive paternity leave policy would have been much
higher than the marriage-based policy. If Congress had made
unmarried fathers eligible for the benefit, then logically it would
have expanded the total pool of eligible servicemen. Although the
military has received some unsuccessful requests for paternity leave
from single fathers,55 unmarried fathers constitute only a small
fraction of all military parents.56 As of 2013, 42.8 percent of all
active duty members of the armed services had dependent children,
but just 5 percent of active duty parents were unmarried.57 Using
these figures, and the assumption that unmarried fathers are just
as likely to request paternity leave as their married counterparts,
the exclusion of unmarried fathers only reduces the number of
servicemen taking the benefit by around 12 percent.58
When compared to leave duration, the marginal benefit of ex-
cluding unmarried fathers from paternity leave seems even more
insignificant. United States Air Force General Lloyd W. Newton
expressed this concern before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services when he stated that “[t]he Air Force continues to study a
policy proposed by the Navy for 21 days of paternity leave. We
understand the rationale, but with over 15,000 new dependents
born to Air Force families yearly we are considering the impacts of
and equity factors.”).
54. Id. 
55. See Karen Jowers, Paternity Leave for Single Military Fathers?, MIL. TIMES (July 23,
2015, 7:36 PM), http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/benefits/2015/07/23/paternity-
leave-single-military-fathers/30590819/ [https://perma.cc/BVU5-EU56].
56. See OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF., 2013 DEMOGRAPHICS REPORT
120, 130-31 (2013). 
57. Id. at 120.
58. See id. (showing that 42.8 percent of persons in the armed services have dependent
children, and 5 percent of persons in the armed services both have children and are
unmarried). Consequently, 11.58 percent of persons in the military with children are
unmarried.
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having those fathers out for 21 days each.”59 Congress ultimately
addressed General Newton’s concerns by drastically reducing the
duration of the proposed leave allowance from twenty-one to ten
days,60 an action that more than halved the benefit.
Another perceived cost of providing unmarried military fathers
access to paternity leave may have been the burden of proving pa-
ternity. Although married men are assumed to be the fathers of
each child born to their wives, unmarried fathers receive no similar
presumption.61 Although suitable administrative policies to avoid
this problem are discussed in Part III,62 it warrants mentioning
here that Congress may have sought to exclude unmarried fathers,
at least in part, because of the administrative burden of determin-
ing paternity.63 Even so, Congress could have chosen to leave the
administrative details of how paternity would be determined to the
leaders of the military branches in order to avoid dealing with the
matter so comprehensively.64
2. Equitable Congruence with Adoptive Leave
Although cost and operational considerations likely played into
Congress’s decision to use marital status as a proxy for paternity,
some broader “equity” considerations probably also shaped the
decision.65 During a hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, Admiral John C. Harvey mentioned the Navy’s goal in
59. Hearing Before Comm. on Armed Servs., supra note 29, pt. 6, at 150 (statement of Gen.
L. Newton).
60. See NDAA, supra note 3, § 532.
61. See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A
HANDBOOK FOR MILITARY FAMILIES, HELPING YOU WITH CHILD SUPPORT 19 (2013) (“Under
state law, a child born during marriage is presumed to be the child of those married parents.
When a child is born outside of a marriage, his or her paternity must be legally established
in order for the child and parents to have certain legal rights and responsibilities.”).
62. See infra Part III.
63. See Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital
Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 178-79 (2015) (“[L]egal rules tend to use marriage as a proxy
for a meaningful family relationship. In the case of certain rights and privileges, legislatures
and courts believe marriage is a necessary condition for receipt of benefits. In the case of par-
enting and the marital presumption, legislatures and courts consider marriage a sufficient
condition to presume commitment and closeness, regardless of actual family circumstances.”).
64. See 10 U.S.C. § 701(j)(1) (2012) (leaving administrative details of the policy to be
determined by “regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned”).
65. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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providing twenty-one days of paternity leave was “to align the
Department’s policy for natural fathers with policy applicable to
adoptive parents, as provided for in the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2006.”66 
The adoptive leave policy referenced by Admiral Harvey, codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 701(i), provides that “a member of the armed forces
adopting a child in a qualifying child adoption is allowed up to 21
days of leave in a calendar year to be used in connection with the
adoption.”67 When compared with the military’s paternity leave
policy before the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 701(i) appears to create a glaring
inequity: fathers who adopted children received twenty-one days
of parental leave, while biological fathers received none at all.68
Although a clear disparity still exists between the twenty-one days
afforded to adoptive fathers and the ten days currently allotted to
married natural fathers,69 perhaps one of the legislature’s aims in
adopting 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) was to take a step, albeit an unsuccess-
ful one, toward correcting this inequity. 
Nevertheless, if equity was truly a substantial consideration in
the legislative process, it seems inconsistent to have then left un-
married fathers altogether out of the benefit. Imagine a scenario in
which an unmarried military father adopts a child with his partner.
The current regime allows him to take twenty-one days of paid leave
in connection with that adoption,70 but affords him no leave if he
chooses to father a biological child with that same partner.71
Disregarding the unfavorable impact that this policy has on married
gay couples,72 one would struggle to label the policy as fundamen-
tally fair.
66. Hearing Before Comm. on Armed Servs., supra note 29, pt. 6, at 149 (statement of
Adm. J. Harvey).
67. See 10 U.S.C. § 701(i)(1).
68. See id. 
69. Compare id., with 10 U.S.C. § 701(j)(1).
70. 10 U.S.C. § 701(i)(1).
71. Id.
72. To illustrate this point, consider the hypothetical case of a married gay man in the
armed services. Should that man and his husband choose to have a child through surrogacy,
and the serviceman donates the genetic material, the serviceman would be unable to take
paternity leave in connection with the birth of his child because his spouse did not (and could
not) give birth to that child. This situation creates substantial inequality between the parent-
al rights afforded to married heterosexual and married homosexual couples in the military.
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3. Promotion of the Marital Family
Perhaps Congress’s decision to limit paternity leave to married
men stemmed, in part, from a slightly biased sense of equity—one
more akin to traditional morality than fairness. Under this fram-
ing, Congress may have sought to reward what it perceived to be the
commitment of married men, and embedded that incentive into 10
U.S.C. § 701(j). Legislation that privileges marriage is not uncom-
mon in the United States,73 and it is possible that Congress viewed
the policy as an additional way to encourage marriage-based fam-
ilies.
Ignoring the problems that the legalization of gay marriage pose
to this logic, the trouble with the marriage-incentive rationality
is that, in this particular case, the policy likely has little positive
effect (and potentially a deleterious one) on the formation of marital
units. Denying an unmarried father who wishes to spend time with
his newborn child that opportunity is a sorry way of encouraging
the formation of marital families. Although the prospect of gaining
ten days of paternity leave might motivate some unmarried persons
to marry before the birth of their child, it seems unlikely that such
a small benefit would entice many to make such a substantial com-
mitment.
Further, any increased likelihood of marriage that this marriage-
exclusive policy creates is likely offset by the cost of the foregone al-
ternative opportunity: unmarried fathers spending more time with
their children (and likely the mothers of those children). Weighing
the marriage-encouraging utility of each of these discrete options,
it is no stretch to claim that an unmarried father’s physical presence
with his child, even if only for ten days, might do more to encourage
marital relationships than the abstract threat of forfeiting those ten
days. 
It warrants mentioning that under this analysis, the encouraged
end was marriage and not preparental marriage. If Congress,
through this legislation, sought to encourage preparental marriage
at the expense of marriages occurring after a couple has had a child,
73. See Huntington, supra note 63, at 178 (“Individual states have different rules, but the
dominant approach draws a clear distinction between married and cohabiting couples, with
the latter receiving far fewer of the rights and obligations associated with marriage.”).
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then the seemingly defective logic of this policy makes more sense.
Setting aside traditional moral ideals, this preparental marriage
preference creates a policy that rewards the formation of marriages
before a child is born, but does nothing to encourage the formation
of such bonds after that child’s birth.
The reality remains that nonmarital children are born to military
fathers.74 Whether a father makes the conscious decision not to
marry the mother of his child before she gives birth, tries to marry
that mother but finds her unwilling, or is prevented from marrying
her because of a preexisting marriage, legislation should encourage
him to form functional relationships with his child’s mother.75 Even
if allowing fathers to take paternity leave has little effect on marital
outcomes, it serves the highly important purpose of fostering
functional co-parenting relationships between parents—relation-
ships that benefit children in the long term.76
In truth, many of the rationalities that led to the creation of 10
U.S.C. § 701(j) remain unknown. Although it is clear that some
parties involved in the decision weighed the policy’s benefits to
servicemen and their families alongside cost, administrability, and
“equity” concerns,77 the resulting legislation punishes a small mi-
nority of single fathers for relatively little benefit. Hopefully, when
Congress revisits this policy in response to Ash Carter’s 2016
proposal78 it will identify its apparent shortcomings and recast it in
a more functionally equitable manner.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO EXPEDITE CHANGE
While discussing the prospects of expanding paternity leave with
a group of sailors in 2015, Chief of Naval Personnel Vice Admiral
74. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
75. See Huntington, supra note 63, at 212-13 (proposing the creation of laws that help
parents become effective co-parents regardless of marital status, in order to help those
parents provide their children with “the relationships necessary for child development” and
“child well-being”).
76. Id. at 213.
77. Hearing Before Comm. on Armed Servs., supra note 29, pt. 6, at 149 (statement of Sec.
D. Chu).
78. See generally FACT SHEET, supra note 6.
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Bill Moran cautioned, “We’re a long ways from that.”79 Less than a
year later, Ash Carter’s 2016 proposal has accelerated that timeline
rapidly.80 Because Carter will soon ask Congress to revisit the policy
codified in 10 U.S.C. § 701(j), the present offers a critical opportu-
nity to highlight the marriage-proxy flaw of 10 U.S.C. § 701(j). To
highlight these flaws, this Part imagines a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) on the grounds that it violates
the Equal Protection Clause. Although a litigant may not prevail
easily in such a challenge, a lawsuit could draw attention to this
flawed policy and potentially expedite change. This Part begins with
a brief discussion of the Equal Protection Clause and its limitations
in the military context in Section A. It then proceeds by presenting
an argument against 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) on the grounds that the law
discriminates against children on the basis of illegitimacy in Sec-
tion B.
A. The Equal Protection Clause and the Military Context 
The Equal Protection Clause was added to the United States
Constitution within the Fourteenth Amendment, and, in pertinent
part, reads “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”81 Although
the clause was initially enacted as a measure to buttress the rights
of newly freed slaves,82 the scope of the law has expanded substan-
tially since its adoption. The provision now prohibits state and fed-
eral governmental entities from denying “equal protection,”83 and
extensive case law has developed the contours of what warrants pro-
tection today. Presently, government rules that classify individuals
79. Steven Beardsley, Navy Leader: Lack of Budget Means Delayed Bonuses, Family
Moves, MILITARY.COM (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/10/15/navy-
leader-lack-of-budget-means-delayed-bonuses-family-moves.html#disqus_thread
[https://perma.cc/D68P-C7QZ] (quoting Chief of Navy Personnel Vice Admiral Bill Moran).
80. See FACT SHEET, supra note 6.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
82. See U.S. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
Civil Rights (1868), http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?Flash=true&doc=43 [https://perma.
cc/67ND-EM6U].
83. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (recognizing that the Fifth Amend-
ment subjects laws passed by the federal government to equal protection review).
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on the basis of race are subject to strict scrutiny, and courts fre-
quently invalidate such rules as being unconstitutional.84 Federal
and state rules that classify individuals on the basis of gender or
illegitimacy are reviewed under a separate framework, frequently
referred to as intermediate scrutiny,85 and courts often invalidate
these rules as well.86 Generally, when a government law or policy
faces intermediate scrutiny, the government must prove that it has
an exceedingly persuasive justification for the law,87 and that the
law is an appropriate means to achieve that purpose.88 
In the hypothetical case that follows, the military context would
potentially have a significant impact on a court’s decision. Although
Congress enacted the military’s universal paternity leave policy by
adopting 10 U.S.C. § 701(j),89 the Supreme Court has often deferred
to Congress’s decisions within the military context.90 This deference
was prominently highlighted in Rostker v. Goldberg, a 1981 Su-
preme Court case in which a man challenged the constitutionality
of a law requiring only men to register for selective service.91 There,
the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the policy was dis-
criminatory on the basis of gender, stating that “judicial deference
to such congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee when
legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and
support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance
84. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967). 
85. For examples of cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated laws discriminating
on the basis of gender using a form of intermediate scrutiny, see United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). For cases in which the Court struck
down laws on the basis of illegitimacy discrimination, see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
86. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776; Gomez, 409 U.S. at 537-38.
87. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (“Our decisions also
establish that the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of
their gender must carry the burden of showing an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the
classification.” (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981))).
88. Id. (“The burden is met only by showing at least that the classification serves
‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ are ‘sub-
stantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’” (quoting Wengler v. Druggists
Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))).
89. 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) (2012).
90. See Tim Bakken, A Woman Soldier’s Right to Combat: Equal Protection in the Mili-
tary, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & LAW 271, 280 (2014) (“Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme
Court, spurred by Associate Justice William Rehnquist, began a policy of extreme deference
toward the military.”).
91. 453 U.S. 57, 59 (1981). 
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is challenged.”92 The Court pointed out that “[Congress’s] decision
to exempt women from registration was not the ‘accidental by-
product of a traditional way of thinking about females,’”93 and rooted
its decision in an implicit acceptance of the notion that women were
not necessary to achieving Congress’s goal of providing our nation
with combat troops.94
Despite this claimed “apogee” of deference,95 the Supreme Court
has also shown some willingness to overturn gender classifications
in the military context, as was the case in Frontiero v. Richardson.96
There, a servicewoman challenged the constitutionality of a military
policy that determined how dependency was established.97 Although
that policy required military wives to prove that their husbands
were actually dependent upon them to receive military dependent
status, military husbands were not required to offer any proof to
have their wives deemed dependent.98 Making no reference to any
special deference, the Supreme Court invalidated the military policy
because Congress offered no suitable reason to justify the “differen-
tial treatment to male and female members of the uniformed
services.”99 
A brief comparison of Frontiero and Rostker suggests that the
deference afforded to congressional decisions in the military context
is not uniformly applied to all challenges. In Rostker, where the
challenged policy related directly to combat operations and the
composition of the fighting force, the Court applied a high degree of
deference.100 By contrast, in Frontiero, where the challenged policy
related to an employment benefit provided to nonmilitary individu-
als, the Court seemed to ignore the military context outright.101
92. Id. at 70.
93. Id. at 74 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977)).
94. See id. at 77 (“The existence of the combat restrictions clearly indicates the basis for
Congress’[s] decision to exempt women from registration. The purpose of registration was to
prepare for a draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded from combat, Congress
concluded that they would not be needed in the event of a draft, and therefore decided not to
register them.”).
95. Id. at 70.
96. 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
97. Id. at 678.
98. Id. at 678-79.
99. Id. at 690.
100. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 69.
101. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 680-82.
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Although the paternity leave policy codified at 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) has
similarities to both the regulation of military combat personnel and
the regulation of military employment benefits, it bears a closer
resemblance to the latter. Providing unmarried fathers the opportu-
nity to take paternity leave could diminish the pool of available
combat personnel,102 but such a concern is wholly tempered by the
fact that any parental leave taken under 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) is sub-
ject to authorization by a serviceman’s commanding officer.103 Thus,
if a commanding officer determines that his combat unit cannot ad-
equately bear the absence of a new father, that commanding officer
is entirely capable of denying paternity leave.104 Accordingly, if 10
U.S.C. § 701(j) is correctly viewed as a rule governing an employ-
ment benefit, the fact that the benefit pertains to military personnel
may not necessarily subject it to heightened judicial deference.
B. Discrimination on the Basis of Illegitimacy
1. Reframing 10 U.S.C. § 701(j): The Child’s Argument
Though not intuitive, the most compelling constitutional argu-
ment for reforming the military’s marriage-exclusive paternity leave
policy is that the rule discriminates against children on the basis of
illegitimacy.105 At first glance, 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) appears to classify
servicemen only on the basis of their marital status.106 Because
marital status is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the
Constitution, one could easily believe that the policy is patently
constitutional. Despite this impression, a careful assessment of the
law—one that acknowledges the fact that every invocation of the
102. See supra Part I.C.1.
103. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that servicemen may only take
“a period of authorized absence” (emphasis added)).
104. See id.
105. At first glance, an alternative claim that 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) discriminates on the basis
of gender also appears viable. Such a claim would likely argue the policy discriminates against
men because they are required to be married to become eligible for parental leave, while
servicewomen face no such marriage requirement. For the purposes of this Note, this gender
argument was not explored more thoroughly because of one critical reality: women actually
give birth to and nurse children; men do not. This clear biological difference, and the physical
difficulty it involves, likely justifies much of the differential treatment of men and women in
the sphere of parental leave.
106. See 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) (2012). 
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policy (or denial thereof) implicates a child—reveals another cate-
gory on which the policy might be classifying: legitimacy. Simply, 10
U.S.C. § 701(j) allows legitimate children access to ten leave days
with their military fathers, while nonmarital military children are
prevented from enjoying the same benefit.107 Through this child-
centered framing of the military’s paternity leave policy, a clever
plaintiff could succeed in undermining the constitutionality of the
policy.108
A central premise of this child-centered argument is that a direct
link exists between the policy set forth in 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) and the
children impacted. Although Congress likely did not aim to
disadvantage the nonmarital children of servicemen through its
exclusion of unmarried fathers, nonmarital children are almost
certainly disadvantaged by their exclusion from the benefit.109
Because a necessary condition for 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) to take effect is
the birth of a child, a strong argument must be made that
nonmarital children are, on the face of the law, distinguished and
discriminated against.110 Rephrasing the policy to read “a member
of the armed forces on active duty who fathers a legitimate child
shall receive 10 days of leave” would have nearly the same effect as
the current one.111
The Court has considered this sort of child-centric reframing in
the context of illegitimacy discrimination with mixed opinions. In
New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, the Court over-
turned a state welfare policy that provided specific benefits to
families “which consist[ed] of a household composed of two adults of
the opposite sex ceremonially married to each other who [had] at
107. See id.
108. An integral assumption of this argument is the issue of whether an affected plaintiff
could even get standing in court to raise this claim. Such an argument would have to be
brought on behalf of an affected child—a complication that would likely require his or her
mother to bring the claim. Nevertheless, this complication has been overcome in past cases
involving the rights of nonmarital children. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763-64
(1977) (allowing a mother to bring a lawsuit on behalf of her nonmarital daughter for
inheritance that her daughter forfeited under an Illinois intestacy statute that excluded
nonmarital children from inheriting from their biological fathers).
109. See supra Part I.A.
110. See 10 U.S.C. § 701(j).
111. This hypothetical phrasing would actually be more inclusive than the current policy
because it would allow recently divorced natural fathers to take paternity leave after a divorce
if their children were born during wedlock. 
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least one minor child ... of both, the natural child of one and adopted
by the other, or a child adopted by both.”112 There, the Court ac-
cepted the petitioner’s argument that “although the challenged
classification turn[ed] upon the marital status of the parents as well
as upon the parent-child relationship, in practical effect it operate[d]
almost invariably to deny benefits to illegitimate children while
granting benefits to [legitimate children].”113
In contrast to this acceptance of a reframing, the Court was not
persuaded by a mother’s arguments in Califano v. Boles that a
Social Security provision granting “mother’s insurance benefits”
exclusively to mothers who were married to deceased wage earners
discriminated against children on the basis of illegitimacy.114 There,
the Court helpfully noted that
[t]he proper classification for purposes of equal protection
analysis is not an exact science, but scouting must begin with
the statutory classification itself. Only when it is shown that the
legislation has a substantial disparate impact on classes defined
in a different fashion may analysis continue on the basis of the
impact on those classes.115
The Court in Califano went on to hold that the legislation did not
have enough of an impact on illegitimate children to warrant an
investigation into the purposes of the law, citing, in part, the fact
that the children of deceased wage earners received separate “child’s
insurance benefits” under the program.116 From these cases, it is not
entirely clear how favorably a court would view the child-centric
framing on which this constitutional challenge to 10 U.S.C. § 701(j)
112. 411 U.S. 619, 619 (1973) (third alteration in original) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:13-
3(a)).
113. Id. at 619-20.
114. 443 U.S. 282, 285-87 (1979). 
115. Id. at 293-94.
116. Id. at 294. 
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relies.117 Accordingly, a fuller discussion of illegitimacy discrimina-
tion is necessary to assess the overall viability of this claim.
2. An Overview of Illegitimacy: Cases and Theoretical
Explanations
Although a handful of cases help to illustrate the Supreme
Court’s rationalities where ruling on alleged government legitimacy
classifications, a complete analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence on
the topic is not warranted here. Even so, two cases are helpful for
introducing the Court’s logic. The first is Levy v. Louisiana, a 1968
case dealing with the rights of a deceased mother’s nonmarital
children to recover in a tort action for their mother’s wrongful
death.118 There, the Court asked “[w]hy should the illegitimate child
be denied rights merely because of his birth out of wedlock?”119 The
Court found no answer to justify sufficiently denying nonmarital
children the right to recover for the death of their mother.120 
Later, in Trimble v. Gordon, the Court seemed to solidify its
position on the constitutionality of discriminating against “illegiti-
mate” children. There, the Court stated that it had “expressly
considered and rejected the argument that a State may attempt to
influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on
the children born of their illegitimate relationships.”121 In Trimble,
a mother brought suit on behalf of her nonmarital daughter for
the inheritance that an Illinois intestacy statute prevented her
daughter from receiving.122 The statute excluded nonmarital chil-
dren from inheriting property from their natural fathers.123 The
117. Should a court reject the argument that 10 U.S.C. § 701(j), on its face, disadvantages
nonmarital children, a potential plaintiff might attempt to gather evidence to show that the
policy has a disparate impact on nonmarital children. If faithfully followed, the policy would
exclude 100 percent of children born out of wedlock to military fathers from receiving the
benefits of paternity leave. Borrowing logic from the Supreme Court’s gender-discrimination
jurisprudence, “when a neutral law has a disparate impact upon a group that has historically
been the victim of discrimination, an unconstitutional purpose may still be at work.” Pers.
Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). 
118. 391 U.S. 68, 69-70 (1968). 
119. Id. at 71.
120. See id.
121. 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977).
122. Id. at 763-65.
123. Id. at 764-65.
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Trimble Court applied a form of heightened scrutiny that required
“more than the mere incantation of a proper state purpose” and a
state purpose that was “carefully tuned to alternative consider-
ations.”124 As such, the Trimble Court rejected the state’s arguments
that the intestacy statute was purposed to promote legitimate fa-
milial relationships and to reduce the administrative burdens of
determining paternity.125
The Court in Trimble disregarded the state’s purported goal of
promoting legitimate familial relationships through the challenged
intestacy rule by finding that “illegitimate children can affect nei-
ther their parents’ conduct nor their own status.”126 Further, the
Court rejected the state’s claim that its rule was rooted in efficiency
concerns related to determining paternity because the rule failed to
strike a “middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion
and case-by-case determination of paternity.”127
Despite its strong language in Trimble, the Supreme Court has
not been entirely consistent with its treatment of laws that classify
individuals on the basis of legitimacy. For example, in another case
involving intestacy statutes, the Court upheld a New York rule
requiring nonmarital children to obtain a filiation order during their
natural father’s lifetime in order to take as heirs.128 In that case, the
Court reasoned that because that law was “substantially related to
the important state interests the statute [was] intended to promote,”
it did not violate the Constitution.129 Considering this seemingly
varied treatment of illegitimacy by the Supreme Court, scholars
have developed some helpful theories to further explain the Court’s
reasoning.
One theory offered to explain the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy
holdings is that the Court prefers parenting relationships that
mimic traditional marital ones.130 Professor Melissa Murray pre-
sents this point through an analysis of both illegitimacy and gender-
based discrimination cases in her article What’s So New About the
124. Id. at 769, 772 (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976)). 
125. Id. at 772-73.
126. Id. at 769-70. 
127. Id. at 770-71.
128. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261-62, 275-76 (1978).
129. Id. at 275-76. 
130. See Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & LAW 387, 390 (2012).
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New Illegitimacy?.131 Viewing Levy and its progeny as “a series of
cases that offer limited protection for nonmarital families, if they
comport themselves in a particular way,” Murray contends the
many illegitimacy cases represent “not necessarily a more liberal
era in law’s treatment of illegitimacy, but rather a permutation of
the common law tradition in which marriage, the marital family,
and marital birth was privileged and prioritized.”132 Murray
espouses the view that as a part of this “permutation” the Court
often examines the strength of relationships between both biological
parents and their children, and between the biological parents
themselves.133 The more those relationships resemble traditional
nuclear marriages, she contends, the more likely the Court is to
protect rights in the nonmarital family context.134
Another theory proffered to explain the Supreme Court’s underly-
ing rationalities in cases involving illegitimacy discrimination is
that of the “Proto-Citizen.”135 According to this hypothesis, the Court
affords “special judicial solicitude” to certain fundamental rights
involving children because they “recognize[] that depriving children
of these rights at the beginning of life sets a pattern of marginaliza-
tion and deprivation that has lasting effects on their ability to
develop into full-fledged citizens.”136 As such, courts are likely to
protect children, not only because they bear little responsibility for
their station in life, but also because of the implications that failing
to do so might have upon their ability to develop into “full-fledged
citizens.”137 
It is important to assess the role that each of these scholarly ex-
planations of Supreme Court behavior might have on the outcome
of the hypothetical case at bar. Considering Professor Murray’s
assessment of the Court’s underlying rationality, the nature of the
nonmarital family involved in this potential litigation could prove
131. See generally id. 
132. Id. at 412. 
133. Id. at 410-13. 
134. Id.
135. See generally Catherine E. Smith & Susannah W. Pollvogt, Children as Pro-Citizens:
Equal Protection, Citizenship, and Lessons from the Child-Centered Cases, 48 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 655 (2014) (discussing how depriving children of certain substantive rights can inhibit
their development as citizens).
136. Id. at 660. 
137. See id. 
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to be an extremely important variable. Under Murray’s frame-
work,138 the Court would respond more sympathetically toward a
plaintiff-child whose unmarried parents remained committed to
both their child and to one another. Moreover, if the Court is truly
motivated by “Proto-Citizen” logic, it might view the long-term
benefits that paternity leave has on children as a compelling reason
to apply favorable illegitimacy discrimination protection to the
plaintiff-child.
3. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny
If a plaintiff succeeded in convincing a court that 10 U.S.C.
§ 701(j) discriminated against children on the basis of illegitimacy,
the policy would then be subject to a form of the intermediate
scrutiny framework discussed earlier.139 Under such a framework,
Congress would need to offer a convincing reason for excluding
unmarried fathers from taking paternity leave in the military.140
Although these rationalities were discussed in greater detail in Part
I.C., a brief review is helpful to assess how favorably a court might
view Congress’s rationalities. Three potential justifications are
addressed below: administrative ease, scope reduction, and marital
family promotion.
First, Congress may have sought to reduce the administrative
burden of determining whether unmarried fathers qualify for leave
by simply excluding them from the benefit outright. If the logic in
Trimble and Frontiero offers any guidance on this matter, such an
argument seems unlikely to succeed as a justification for the pol-
icy.141 Although Frontiero dealt with gender discrimination, there
the Court noted that its “prior decisions make clear that, although
efficacious administration of governmental programs is not without
some importance, ‘the Constitution recognizes higher values than
speed and efficiency.’”142 
138. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
141. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 690 (1973).
142. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).
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Additionally, the Court in Trimble, dealing in the context of il-
legitimacy discrimination, found that the difficulties associated with
proving paternity—and the dangers of spurious claims—were not
compelling reasons for completely excluding nonmarital children
from intestacy benefits.143 In the hypothetical case at bar, Congress’s
failure to provide any “middle ground between the extremes of com-
plete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity”144
would likely cause a court to view the appropriateness of 10 U.S.C.
§ 701(j) skeptically. By offering no alternative means for unmarried
fathers—and their children—to access the benefits of paternity
leave, Congress may have stretched its efficiency argument beyond
constitutionally justifiable bounds.
Similar to administrative ease, Congress’s other potential argu-
ments to justify 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) would likely also fail to persuade
a court. Although the exclusion of unmarried fathers may have been
intended as a measure to cut the cost and scope of a military pa-
ternity leave benefit,145 unmarried fathers only constitute a small
fraction of the individuals eligible for the benefit.146 It seems unlike-
ly that a court would view such a small reduction in program size as
an adequate reason for the exclusion of an entire class of protected
individuals from the benefit. 
Finally, if Congress sought to promote marital families by adopt-
ing this policy, not only did it choose a poor means of doing so, but
such a rationale would likely violate the principle made clear in
Trimble: “no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the
illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of
deterring the parent.”147
Admittedly, a challenge to 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) on the grounds that
it constitutes illegitimacy discrimination would need to rely on a
great deal of luck in order to be successful. Arising in an unfavor-
able military context, and relying upon creative reframing, the
argument is undoubtedly vulnerable to dismissal. Despite these vul-
nerabilities, an unsuccessful lawsuit could serve to draw attention
143. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770-76.
144. Id. at 770-71.
145. See supra Part I.C.1.
146. See OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF., supra note 56, at 112.
147. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972)).
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to this flawed policy. At its core, the underlying message of such a
suit—that nonmarital children deserve equal access to paternal
care—is one worth advancing.
III. A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
One of the most striking features of the policy codified in
10 U.S.C. § 701(j) is that it is entirely discrete in nature. Other than
marriage, unmarried fathers have no alternative avenues through
which to prove their eligibility for paternity leave. Considering such
a policy’s logical shortcomings148 and corresponding constitutional
issues,149 Congress must consider an alternative plan. Although
making all servicemen eligible for paternity leave upon the alleged
birth of their natural child seems sufficiently inclusive to rectify the
policy’s current shortcomings, in light of genuine resource con-
straints, such a solution may not be a realistic legislative goal. For
this reason, Congress should amend 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) to allow un-
married fathers the opportunity to rebut a presumption that they
are ineligible for paternity leave. The exact means by which a
serviceman might rebut this presumption is discussed in this Part.
A realistic alternative to the military’s current paternity leave
policy must provide unmarried servicemen with an opportunity to
take paternity leave and check that opportunity with a fair and ef-
ficient clearing mechanism to limit abuse. This abuse could arise in
a variety of ways, but three important concerns are worth noting:
fraudulent use, misuse, and overuse. Fraudulent use might occur if
an unmarried serviceman takes leave knowing that he is not the
natural father of a child, or takes leave under the mistaken impres-
sion that he is the natural father. Misuse describes a scenario in
which an unmarried father takes paternity leave, but uses the leave
entirely for purposes other than interacting with his child. Finally,
overuse refers to an obscure scenario in which an unmarried father
might be able to take leave more frequently than his married
comrades by fathering children with multiple women. Although
some mechanisms might be necessary to address these specific
148. See supra Part I.C. 
149. See supra Part II. 
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concerns, a carefully drafted revision of 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) policy
could mitigate many of these issues.
Fraudulent use probably constitutes the most valid concern that
Congress might have with allowing unmarried fathers to take pa-
ternity leave. The issue is simple: How do we decide who is actually
a father, and how do we make that determination efficiently?
Although the current answer to this question—using marriage as a
proxy for fatherhood—seems to address this concern, less restrictive
options exist. For example, one option is to require fathers to sign
a legally binding voluntary acknowledgement of paternity. The
Department of Defense has already adopted such voluntary acknow-
ledgements as an expedited vehicle for determining the healthcare
eligibility of children born out of wedlock to servicemen.150 This
healthcare policy relies on state law “procedure[s] to allow a father
to voluntarily acknowledge paternity of a child born out of wedlock”
as a means of avoiding more arduous, judicially obtained paternity
determinations.151 Although such an acknowledgement requires the
acknowledger to assume legal responsibility as a parent, it provides
a means by which an unmarried military father can efficiently
establish his own paternity. Integrating a similar acknowledgement
option into 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) would surely inhibit fraudulent use,
while providing committed unmarried fathers an alternative vehicle
through which to take paternity leave.
In order to address the issues of misuse and overuse, a revised 10
U.S.C. § 701(j) would likely require no further alteration. This is
because each of these perceived abuses remains largely unaddressed
under the current policy. To illustrate this point with misuse, com-
pare a hypothetical married military father on paternity leave to an
unmarried military father who signed a voluntary acknowledgment
in order to take the leave. Under the language of 10 U.S.C. § 701(j),
neither man would be legally bound to spend any of that leave time
with his newborn. In this situation, a belief that the unmarried fa-
ther is more likely to misuse his leave than a married father seems
dubious at best, and is likely based on stereotypical reasoning.
150. See Memorandum from David S. Chu, Under Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys of the Military
Dep’ts on Determinations of Dependency for Health-Care Benefits for Out-of-Wedlock
Children (Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocse/dcl_08_07a.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X4XN-9V2J].
151. Id. at Attachment 1. 
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Because married servicemen are as free to misuse their paternity
leave as their unmarried counterparts, adding additional provisions
to 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) to prevent unmarried servicemen from
misusing their paternity leave seems unnecessary and inequitable.
Finally, there is the lingering concern of overuse. Although rela-
tively obscure, this worry arises from a conceivable asymmetry be-
tween married and unmarried fathers. Disregarding some conceiv-
able exceptions,152 under 10 U.S.C. § 701(j), a married serviceman
will only become eligible for paternity leave, at most, approximately
once every nine months. The same would not be true for unmarried
servicemen under a revised policy. A particularly vigorous soldier
could conceivably father children by different women on a far more
compressed timeline. Disregarding the financial deterrents that
would likely accompany that soldier’s frequent acknowledgment of
paternity, such a concern could be entirely neutralized by introduc-
ing a frequency requirement to 10 U.S.C. § 701(j). Such an amend-
ment could simply limit servicemen eligibility for paternity leave to
once every eight months. Considering the relative obscurity of the
threat posed by paternity leave overuse, and the adverse impact
that such a policy could have on military families who have
premature babies,153 this Note does not advocate for a frequency
limitation as a worthwhile addition to 10 U.S.C. § 701(j).
Balancing the need for expanded military paternity leave with
these concerns of efficiency and abuse, a suitable revision of 10
U.S.C. § 701(j)(1) could read as follows:
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned, a
member of the armed forces on active duty whose spouse gives
birth to a child, or an unmarried member of the armed forces on
active duty who signs a legally binding voluntary acknowledge-
ment of paternity for his child before the child’s birth or within
152. For an exception, consider the case of a fast remarriage. If a married serviceman di-
vorced his wife shortly after taking paternity leave for the birth of their child, and then
remarried a different woman whom he impregnated during his previous marriage, under the
current rule, he would be eligible to take paternity leave multiple times within a nine-month
span.
153. Another problem with a frequency requirement is that it is incongruous with the
military’s adoptive leave policy. Under the policy set forth in 10 U.S.C. § 701(i), no frequency
limit is set on the number of children a servicemember may adopt. 
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three months thereafter, shall receive fourteen days of leave to
be used in connection with the birth of the child.
Undoubtedly, such a revision would send a stronger “message to
servicemembers about the respect their Services have for their per-
sonal lives,”154 and the important role of all fathers in the lives of
their children.
CONCLUSION
Although ten, or even the proposed fourteen, days of military
paternity leave might seem insignificant in the greater scheme of
fatherhood, 10 U.S.C. § 701(j) should be viewed as a law that per-
petuates two troubling assumptions: that unmarried fathers are
inherently less deserving parents than their married counterparts,
and that nonmarital children are less deserving of paternal care
than their marital peers. Through an assessment of its legislative
history, logical flaws, potential constitutional shortcomings, and ac-
ceptable modifications, this Note has advocated for a revision of 10
U.S.C. § 701(j) that affords all military fathers the opportunity to
take paternity leave. Every child born to a military father, re-
gardless of the household in to which he or she is born, deserves an
opportunity to receive early paternal care. Through a revision of 10
U.S.C. § 701 (j), Congress now has a great opportunity to take a
meaningful step towards eroding longstanding assumptions about
the role of unmarried fathers in American parenthood.
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